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Volz argues that the task of ethics can no longer be limited to the familiar questions 
of moral theory in the age of modernity: the questions of morality or right conduct 
for the autonomous individual (Volz, 1993; Kiesel and Volz, 2004). This is the 
framework that has formed the conventional ethics of social work as an individual 
therapy. Social work, Volz proposes, should now address itself to the task of 
enabling the individual to choose and live a life as a member of a specific cultural 
community, who at least potentially possesses a full and specific conception of the 
good life particular to his biography and socio-cultural circumstances (Volz, 2003). 
Such a move would recover the classical quest of philosophical ethics: for the good 
life and human flourishing. Volz proposes that the ‘heart of social work’ should be a 
‘Lebensführungshermeneutik’ or ‘hermeneutics of life practice’ in which the 
professional aims above all to help the client discover the meaning of the life he 
wishes to lead.  
 
In this paper I will consider the role not only of social work but of welfare policy 
and practice more generally in promoting the realisation of the good life. The 
traditional discourse of professional ethics in the social professions has turned on 
respect and human rights. More recently it has begun to address itself more 
explicitly to wider questions of the good life and human flourishing, not merely in 
the abstract, but in particular real communities and cultural circumstances. The 
endeavours of professional ethics in the welfare professions lie within mainstream 
western political theory, social policy and state sponsored welfare practice. As such 
they are primarily oriented towards human flourishing; they are informed by what 
analysts of environmental thought often refer to as an anthropocentric perspective.  
 
Against this orientation of mainstream theory towards human flourishing can be 
counterposed the perspective of environmentalism, ecologism or green political 
thought. (I shall treat these contentious and inexact concepts as broadly cognate.) 
This conceives of human welfare as just one aspect of the wider good of the world. 
It presents a renewed critique of humankind’s relation to nature. It rates some 
common human aspirations well below the preservation of the ecological integrity of 
the planet and its non-human constituents. As a consequence of these different 
perspectives and traditions, welfare practice and environmentalism have, so far, 
largely ignored one another. This paper contends that such indifference is 
incompatible with the internal logic of both traditions. Adopting the contemporary 
discourse of sustainable development, I argue that social policy and welfare practice 
should extend their vision so as to respond to the imperatives of environmentalism. 
Since what divides social welfare from environmentalism is, above all, a difference 
of perspectives and values, the appropriate response of social welfare must include 
practical interventions to promote value change.  
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In observing the shifting emphasis of the professional ethics of welfare from a 
discourse of rights and justice to a discourse of human flourishing, I argue therefore 
that a further move is needed to bring the professional ethics of the social 
professions face to face with the moral and political imperative that threatens to 
overtake all other concerns in the coming decades: the need to find a human and 
political response to the threat of global ecological catastrophe in any of the many 
forms that now threaten. In devising a new moral framework for the age of the 
ecological imperative, conceptions of rights and justice derived from liberal moral 
theory, and conceptions of human flourishing and the good life rooted in the 
classical tradition but finding new expression in the modern quest for sustainability, 
have essential elements to contribute. The challenge for the social professions in 
future will be to satisfy not only modern conceptions of rights and justice, and 
facilitate the creation and expression of ways of human flourishing in tune with 
contemporary knowledge and experience, but to find ways of doing so that will help 
avert rather than intensify the threat of global eco-disaster. 
Social welfare and humanist values 
In the twentieth century the idea that governments must promote social welfare 
became the norm throughout the developed world. This meant, for example, that as 
far as possible people should be freed from disease, provided with sufficient means 
of living and compulsorily educated at public expense. Welfare has become the 
policies and programmes, industries and professions that now consume very 
substantial portions of national income. 
 
In the business of social welfare it is taken for granted that it is human welfare we 
are concerned with; its pursuit is deemed worth almost any price because, on this 
standard ideology, there can be no higher end (Barry, 1990). While in practice 
‘welfare’ as a policy area has to compete with other pressing, and complementary, 
public concerns such as defence, public order and macroeconomic management, it is 
hardly questioned that, other things being equal, we should all welcome more and 
better health care, education and so forth.  
 
Welfare policies embody the humanist values of the western religious and 
philosophical traditions. These are well known and need only brief recapitulation. 
Theory building for welfare proceeds by identifying the essential interests of people. 
Doyal and Gough (1991), for example, argue that basic human needs comprise 
physical health and autonomy. Health is a prerequisite for fully human functioning, 
while autonomy is essential to the realisation of ways of life that allow the full 
development of human potential and creativity. Within this tradition controversies 
turn on whether welfare is maximised by positing only a minimalist theory of human 
good - as with Rawls and other liberals - or whether a more prescriptive doctrine on 
human nature is needed in particular to allow the flourishing of characteristically 
disempowered groups - as with varieties of socialism and feminism. From these 
concepts flow competing projects on the role of the state, the market and voluntary 
associations in the promotion of welfare. This is the terrain of the dominant 
discourse on welfare and while many of its central concepts are contestable and its 
theories perennially controversial, there is agreement about one fundamental 
premise: the object of theory and the ultimate goal of intervention and practice is the 
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welfare of human persons. Issues such as poverty and justice acquire their 
significance within the discourse of human welfare.  
 
The traditional theory of welfare is underpinned by a broadly Kantian ethic of right 
action towards human persons. Humans as moral agents have the capacity, and the 
obligation, to respect other bearers of the capacities and rights of autonomous 
personhood and responsible citizenship. In practice, welfare policies also frequently 
adopt a utilitarian attitude in which the (perceived) general good of society 
constitutes the principal frame of reference for decision making. The contrasting 
imperatives of these two approaches occupy much controversy in welfare policy. 
They all share, nonetheless, what political environmentalism terms the 
‘anthropocentric’ perspective: they conceive of welfare exclusively as human 
welfare (Stenmark, 2002). 
Contrast: the values of environmentalism 
Environmentalism (in which I subsume ‘greenism’, ‘ecologism’, and so forth) 
represents a broad range of theoretical orientations and practical politics separated 
by sometimes deep scientific and philosophical divisions and having, perhaps, little 
in common apart from a shared apprehension about the immediate and eventual 
consequences of human impact on the natural world. These ideological divisions 
have been thoroughly taxonomised and criticised in many other places (see for 
example: Yearley, 1991; Goodin, 1992; Eckersley, 1992; Hayward, 1998; Baxter, 
1999; Barry, 1999; Garner, 2000; Cahill and Fitzpatrick, 2002). Despite these 
differences, the general themes of environmentalism are well known: concern about 
environmental pollution and degradation; about the loss of biodiversity and the 
depletion of resources essential to decent conditions of life both now and in the 
future; dismay at the perceived fracturing of humankind’s necessary relationship 
with itself and with nature. It is within what are frequently termed ‘ecocentric’ 
perspectives that a radical disjunction with traditional welfare thinking appears. 
Ecocentrism rebuts the assumption of welfare theory that it is exclusively human 
welfare we should be concerned about. For ecocentrism it is axiomatic that the 
welfare of other entities - such as animals, natural environments, species or 
ecosystems - is of equal or greater concern than human welfare as such. 
 
Whatever the merits of the different positions, for the purpose of this paper I shall 
merely make the minimalist assumption that the case for a moderate 
environmentalism is beyond doubt. This is well enough expressed in the rationale 
for sustainable development: that civilised life for all of Earth’s citizens, both 
present and future, will very soon become unsupportable unless drastic measures are 
taken to control pollution, conserve resources, slow down climate change, safeguard 
ecosystems and thus ensure the long term sustainability of the means of life 
(Brundtland, 1987; Dobson, 2000, Chapter 3).  This moderate position neither 
precludes or entails the more radical claims of ‘deep ecology’ (Barry, 1999) and 
other theories that intend to reconceptualise the whole of humankind’s relationship 
with the natural and social world; for my purposes such theories are optional to the 
argument here. I take it as self-evident that, unless the means of life are sufficiently 
safeguarded for present and future generations, the more specific values and 
aspirations typically associated with the promotion of social welfare – for example, 
rights to health, livelihood and social participation - will quite simply be 
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unattainable. There is no potential for advanced concepts of social welfare or social 
citizenship in a world that cannot first resolve the problem of mere survival. 
 
Environmentalism is not, of course, without prescriptions and implications for social 
relations in general and social welfare in particular. On the contrary, almost all 
varieties of environmental philosophy and politics apart from the palest green 
consumerism entail visions of society in which human needs will not only allegedly 
be better met than is the case in modern industrial society, but in which the nature of 
those welfare needs is radically reconceptualised. However, the response of social 
welfare to the challenge of environmentalism has been limited, as we shall see next. 
Sustainable development and social policy  
In the British social policy literature there have been only limited attempts to address 
the theoretical, political and policy challenges posed by the green critique of the 
industrial ways of life in which subsists standard welfare theory. Meg Huby’s text 
on Social Policy and the Environment (Huby, 1998) focuses on a number of need 
and policy areas having significant environmental implications: food, water, 
housing, domestic energy, travel and leisure. Huby shows that environmental 
considerations must impact on the achievement of typical social policy ends and 
remarks on inequality, sustainability and responsibility as common themes between 
social policy and studies of the environment. However, Huby does not further 
pursue the enquiry into how the assumptions and methods of social policy itself - as 
academic discipline and as political praxis - may need to be revised in the light of 
critiques emanating from environmentalism, especially the more radical sorts. 
 
Fitzpatrick (Fitzpatrick, 1998) discusses the lack of impact of ‘ecologism’ on social 
policy. ‘Ecologists’ (a term Fitzpatrick uses to refer to adherents of a political 
ideology, not to life scientists of the mutual relationships between species and their 
environment) criticise conventional welfare provision as a system of social control. 
They argue that social cohesion and solidarity require social equality, and share with 
feminism a critique of the role of women in market societies. A more specific 
criticism from the green movement is that welfare has become dependent on 
unsustainable continual growth. Fitzpatrick proposes that welfare theory may belong 
to one of two approaches. The conventional, environmentally blind ‘productivist’ 
model favours indiscriminate growth and the ethic of the pre-eminence of paid 
employment over other activity. Alternatively an ecological model of welfare would 
comprise ecologically measured, sustainable growth. It would adopt welfare 
associationalism as proposed by Hirst (1998) in which the state and the market must 
be supplanted by non-market decentralisation and social participation. The 
employment ethic must give way to a work ethic which values non wage earning, 
informal activity and non-wage mechanisms for the transfer of resources and 
definition of social roles. Fitzpatrick cautions however that green advocacy of higher 
taxation on consumption may carry the risk of ‘ecologists ... aligning themselves 
with the regressive policies of modern Conservatism’ (ibid., p.21). 
 
The neglect of environmental concerns by social policy is indeed paralleled in social 
democracy as a political ideology. Callaghan (2000) remarks on traditional Labour 
attitudes that the environment was an irrelevance to the classic goals of improving 
living and working conditions for the working class. However, across northern 
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Europe new left, social-democratic movements and red-green alliances have 
challenged the traditional alignments of social democracy with the labour unions. 
This has opened the way for parties of the moderate left to adopt, at least notionally, 
light green political perspectives; and these are now typically expressed in the 
language of sustainable development. 
 
George and Wilding apply this concept of sustainability, borrowed from the 
environmental debate, to explore trends and prospects in several areas of social 
policy. Their chapter on the environment ascribes problems to ‘four core interacting 
social values’ (George and Wilding, 1999 p.107): industrialism, consumerism, 
individualism and anthropocentrism. They note that the environment has never been 
a central issue in British politics. Policies for environmental improvement are seen 
as frequently ineffectual or incoherent, showing little if any progress in most areas 
albeit with some exceptions. They conclude that: ‘The Brundtland view that it is 
possible to combine economic growth with the preservation of the environment is 
now generally accepted’ (ibid., p.125), but remark that ‘The arrival of a green and 
sustainable society depends to a large extent on the public acceptance of a new set of 
values’ (ibid., p.127). 
 
Shaw takes a similar line, suggesting that ‘in the future, thinking about social 
policies may increasingly be informed by thinking upon sustainability’ (Shaw, 1999, 
p.366). Shaw’s analysis shares the insight of other authors that there is a 
fundamental conflict of perspective between traditional welfare theory and policy, 
and the central concerns of environmentalism: 
[T]he green welfare agenda separates the twin conventional priorities of full 
employment and rising living standards by redefining both the nature and 
value of work and by adopting wider quality of life measures (including 
quality of environment) in the place of economic living standards (ibid., 
p.367). 
 
In conclusion it can only be said that academic social policy has so far offered but a 
partial and tentative response to the arguments, insights and values of the broad 
environmental movement. Michael Cahill’s comment perhaps sums up the attitude 
of welfare specialists towards the environmental critique: ‘In most areas of social 
policy the green perspective offers nothing new in the sense of policy ideas. Any 
novelty comes from the priority which it accords to an environmental perspective’ 
(Cahill, 1999, p.481). Nevertheless explorations continue to advance, specifically, 
social welfare policy and practice towards new models supportive of environmental 
sustainability (Cahill and Fitzpatrick, 2002; Fitzpatrick and Cahill, 2002).  
Sustainable development and welfare practice: two examples 
Social welfare theory has, then, produced only a modest response to the 
environmentalist critique of consumer society. Let us consider more specifically the 
response of the social professions in two fields of practice: personal social services 
and community development. Both examples are drawn from the British context. 
Personal social services 
Personal social services such as social work and social care are directed towards 
individuals whose needs for support in daily living, for care or control are relatively 
large in comparison with the community in general. These services directly engage a 
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large proportion of the population at some time or other during life; they comprise a 
significant sector of public expenditure; and they occupy a very substantial paid 
workforce. Given this centrality, it might seem surprising that ruling conceptions of 
social needs and care, as realised in the applicable legislation, in the agencies of 
service delivery and in the ideology and practice of welfare professionals, have 
hardly been affected by the environmentalist critique. As Hugman remarks, ‘the 
ethics of ecology ... has not been widely attended to in the caring professions’ 
(Hugman, 2005, p.103). 
 
The aim of social work, I have argued elsewhere, is to promote the realisation of an 
ordinary life (Clark, 2000). The conception of an ordinary life played out in 
contemporary welfare practice reflects the familiar dominant values of industrialism 
and consumerism characteristic of the society in which it is embedded. Welfare 
professionals tend to – and arguably ought to – aspire for their clients the 
achievement of traditional goals as communicated and perpetually refabricated by 
popular culture. Much recent policy discourse has been focused on social inclusion, 
a concept that specifically promotes the participation of hitherto excluded minorities 
in the opportunities and responsibilities accepted as normative in contemporary 
society (Percy-Smith, 2000). Notwithstanding the growth of a thin veneer of light 
green consumerism, popular culture is generally unreceptive to the somewhat 
uncomfortable thesis of sustainable development.  
 
Although what predominates in welfare is the aspiration to a conventional western 
lifestyle, there are some exceptions which demonstrate at least that the connection 
between conventional ‘welfare’ and consumerism is not an entirely necessary one. 
Various kinds of therapeutic and residential communities have been built upon 
ideologies that reject to some extent the conventional values of consumerism. 
Interestingly, many such communities have been devised in response to the needs of 
individuals with severe long term disabilities and have sought to replace what is held 
to be the false lifestyle of consumerism – never a realistic aspiration for individuals 
with severe disabilities - with a more holistic and encompassing philosopy. The 
Steiner communities for individuals with learning disabilities are a well known 
example. Indeed, it is in the utopian aspiration to develop new communities that 
welfare practice begins to leave behind consumerism and move towards 
sustainability, as will be discussed next. 
Sustainable development and community involvement 
Sustainable development famously requires local action alongside global 
consciousness. In Agenda 21 the UN enjoined that ‘by 1996, most local authorities 
in each country should have undertaken a consultative process with their populations 
and achieved a consensus on a "local agenda 21" for the community’ (United 
Nations, 1999). That is a large ambition and so far only patchily achieved, at best 
(Cahill, 2001, Chapter 3). For example, a study by the Scottish Executive found 
relatively low levels of awareness of the LA21 process amongst LA21 officers in 
eight Scottish local authorities (Scottish Executive, 2002). If this is representative of 
specialist local government officers one would hardly expect to find a good 
understanding of LA21 amongst the general public. However, local consultation is 
perhaps further advanced on those policies likely to excite powerful opposition, such 
as traffic congestion charging schemes for city centres.  
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From the field of social welfare it is the theory and practice of community 
development that may have the most pertinent contribution to make towards 
sustainable developmemt. Community development focuses on building the 
involvement of local citizens in addressing issues of local concern. It prioritises the 
political and practical principle that improvements in local housing, transport, 
economic opportunity, education, leisure or amenity are always best constructed 
through participation and partnership with local citizens; it rejects the untrammelled 
authority of established status and political power over the aspirations of ordinary 
citizens.  
 
The approach of community development has been adopted from time to time in 
several areas of British social policy, including colonial development, urban 
renewal, social work and adult or community education. It has remained, however, 
largely peripheral to all these fields. Nevertheless community development has 
always understood that lasting improvements in environmental practice at the local 
level can only be achieved with the active support and involvement of the local 
community. Without this, the best efforts of politicians or experts to improve 
resource use or amenity are likely to meet an unreceptive or hostile public, and fail. 
This applies as much to urban improvements in industrialised countries as it does to 
the conservation of threatened species and environments or improved land use in the 
tropics. 
 
Given this perspective of community development on one side, and the ever-
growing if not always well focused general public and political support for 
sustainable development on the other, one might have expected a notably vigorous 
coming together of their respective practices. Shaw  has it that: 
‘... the Green welfare agenda separates the twin conventional priorities of full 
employment and rising living standards by redefining both the nature and 
value of work and by adopting wider quality of life measures (including 
quality of environment) in the place of economic living standards’ (Shaw, 
1999, p.367) 
and goes on to comment that: 
 ‘Little of this thinking is different from mainstream social policy ideas on 
community development and it has been argued that Green perspectives offer 
little new to many areas of social policy’ (ibid., p.368). 
 
In fact, despite some interesting exceptions to be discussed shortly, there is little 
evidence of any widespread cross-fertilisation between the institutions and 
exponents of social welfare and those of sustainable development. This may well be 
partly attributable to the chronic institutional weakness of community development 
in British social welfare. Crescy Cannan  however goes further by arguing that there 
is probably a gulf of culture and discourse between social welfare and 
environmentalism. She argues that greenism tends to prioritise saving places and 
species: ‘until recently, the green movement in Britain has stressed the threat to the 
countryside and wild places rather than environmental issues in the urban context’ 
(Cannan, 2000, p.367); whereas by contrast, ‘community development has 
prioritized people over "nature" and, in general, the urban over the rural’ (ibid., 
p.369). Cannan criticises some greens’ naive, or objectionably prescriptive, 
understanding of community, democracy and power, and proposes that the expertise 
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of community development in understanding democracy and supporting 
participation would equally be relevant to the green agenda. 
 
Two recent research reports offer useful insights into how the worlds of welfare and 
environmentalism could better address each other’s concerns. Burningham and 
Thrush (2001) investigated the environmental concerns of people living in 
disadvantaged urban areas. Noting that it is disadvantaged groups that often 
experience the worst environments, they found that local priorities were identified 
with local and sometimes small-scale issues such as dirt and litter rather than wider 
concerns such as pollution, resource depletion or energy use. Poverty frequently 
limited people’s ability to act in environmentally more responsible ways, for 
example by investing in more energy efficient appliances. The authors point to the 
risk of alienation between the exponents of environmentalism and the concerns of 
ordinary people: 
There is a danger, however, that the language of environmental justice, 
which links "poor people" with "poor environments", might not only 
reinforce a negative image in some localities but may ignore the distinctive 
problems faced by poor people living in "good/desirable/beautiful" rural 
environments’. 
 
Church and Elster (2002) surveyed a range of local action projects, choosing 
projects that combined environmental and social activity. They found that such 
projects could make a limited though still locally important environmental impact. 
The social impacts were more significant, including job creation, training, 
community development and capacity building. Projects helped to build awareness, 
understanding and engagement with environmental action. This finding echoes the 
classic doctrine of community development that it is the gains in understanding and 
skills, social solidarity and political effectiveness that are of greater long term 
significance than the purely practical improvements gained through local action. The 
authors note the limited funding and institutional support for such initiatives and 
argue for better integration of environmental and social agendas. 
Reconstructing values as a target of welfare policy 
The environmental crisis threatens and subverts the achievement of welfare. In the 
face of all-pervasive environmentally unsustainable practices, the goals of welfare 
will not be realised merely by pursuing conventional policies for it. Predominant 
attitudes towards the environment will progressively impede the advance of welfare, 
even on the narrow conception that regards the environment as purely instrumental 
to the satisfaction of human material needs. This impasse is caused by social 
attitudes of neglect for environmental values. I will argue that it is therefore 
necessary for social policy itself - and the practitioners who work in its systems - to 
address the consciously or unthinkingly anti-environmental values widely found in 
the general population, in social institutions and economic systems. 
 
It might be objected at this point that it is not the proper function of social policy to 
change values, if by social policy is meant the activity of government and its 
agencies exerted directly and indirectly on acknowledged social problems. Social 
values, on this view, are for individual conscience, politics, religion and the 
institutions of civil society to debate, but not, in a liberal democracy, for government 
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agencies to prescribe or promote. The idea of governments promoting specific social 
values carries disturbing associations of state paternalism or worse, totalitarianism. 
In contemporary British politics it is easy to identify, for example, a bristling 
reaction to the more communitarian or, as some would say, sanctimonious aspects of 
Blairite social policy. 
 
This objection is based on an overly narrow, or perhaps purist, view of the 
separation of powers in liberal democracy. Some examples will show that the 
changing of social values is in fact widely accepted as a legitimate goal of social 
policy. When measures to prevent drunk driving were given more stringent force by 
the introduction of a specific blood alcohol limit and subsequently, by the 
introduction of quasi-random breath testing, it was necessary for government 
agencies to challenge and reverse the widely prevalent attitude that the amount a 
person chose to drink was entirely his private business and not a proper area for state 
regulation or interference.  
 
A second example comes from the arrival of AIDS. This showed that when faced 
with the uncontrolled spread of an incurable and seemingly deadly disease, 
government agencies could lead the way to a public frankness about sexual 
behaviour and disease prevention that had previously been unthinkable in the 
ordinary media. A side effect of the government AIDS awareness campaign has 
been to transform the public discourse on all aspects of sexuality. 
 
A third example comes from social work. During the 1980s a government agency, 
the Central Council for Education and Training in Social Work, determined that 
principles of anti-discriminatory practice should permeate all of social work 
education. Anti-discriminatory practice required social workers to challenge racism, 
and other forms of oppression, wherever they might be encountered. As state 
employed professionals, social workers were expected to lead the way in changing 
racist values not only in government and its agencies but also among the ordinary 
population including clients in particular. 
 
What these examples, amongst many other that might be cited, show is that the role 
of social policy is, on occasion, to set out deliberately to change social values. The 
targets of such changes are not even necessarily restricted to supposedly benighted 
or reactionary minorities who are seen to need remedial attention to bring them into 
line with the decent values of the rest of society. It is majority attitudes that may just 
as well be challenged. Social policies designed to bring about changes of values in 
the general population are not responses to mass movements of opinion but the 
creations of opinion leaders and experts aided by agencies of government. Citizens 
come to accept the legitimacy of social interventions designed to change values 
provided that such interventions are accepted as instrumental to legitimate broader 
policies. 
Changing environmental values 
The political acceptability of sustainability policies would seem at the present time 
to be finely balanced. On one side, a light green consumerism is relatively 
uncontroversial. Many people are willing to sort and recycle their domestic rubbish 
if it is not too inconvenient or laborious, and they are not in principle hostile to 
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government exhortations on the subject. Observation suggests, however, that 
environmental sympathy is generally restricted to changes seen as having no more 
than marginal consequences for current lifestyles. Despite the overwhelming 
environmental case for reducing carbon emissions, in 2001 popular resistance easily 
stopped the rather modest British fuel tax escalator in its tracks. Road pricing and 
other intrusive controls on car use are so politically contentious that governments, 
both central and local, hesitate even to air the possibilities. Environmental policies 
that might have a serious impact on present ways of life, or consequences for 
industry, or costs in individual opportunity do not appear to have widespread 
political support. 
 
For all its amibiguity, sustainable development is nevertheless applauded by 
virtually everybody. In these circumstances, where policy ends that are widely seen 
as essential are frustrated by reactionary social attitudes and values, it is arguably 
legitimate and necessary for social policy to address the changing of values. The 
wide consensus on the aims of welfare will be increasingly frustrated by political 
reluctance to contemplate the environmental cost. This reluctance is attributable to 
the continuation of what are fundamentally, if perhaps unconsciously, anti-
environmentalist values. If government is to promote welfare from the longer term 
perspective of sustainability it must work to change the social values that impede 
pro-environmental laws and policies.  
 
How is this to be done? Although detailed programmes will have to be pursued in 
other places, some broad principles can be suggested. The first could be thought of 
as a plea for political honesty. There is, for example, no long term benefit in 
pretending that we can enjoy ever increasing opportunities for cheap air travel on 
tax-free fuel without counting the effect on global warming and the ruin of 
countryside by runway building and use. And if a plea for honest politicians seems a 
little naive, the examples given above do illustrate that governments can, and must, 
stop avoiding the politically unpalatable when the situation gets serious enough. 
Perhaps we are almost ready to accept a political climate based on strong principles 
of environmental sustainablility, as we have become used to the idea of a new 
climate of restraints on sexual behaviour in order to avoid the uncontrollable spread 
of AIDS already seen in some countries. 
 
At the macro level of policy, governments plainly must attempt to pursue policies 
for long-term sustainability. To do so means tackling not only the scientific, 
technological and economic issues, but also specifically addressing the changes in 
social attitudes and values necessary to legitimate moves towards sustainability. The 
street between improved technology and socially supported cultural change must run 
both ways, since the innovations of technical experts will fail unless they have social 
and political support. An example comes from changing thinking about the 
conservation of especially valuable natural environments in national parks and 
nature reserves. These used to be thought of as pristine islands in an otherwise over-
exploited and degraded natural world, to be isolated as far as possible from human 
interference. Indeed in some places an idea of conservation was pursued at the cost 
of displacing the human residents. Now it is widely recognised that conservation 
policies will fail unless they have the enthusiasm of local people, who may well 
have a tradition of sustainable exploitation of the resources without bringing about 
their long term destruction (see O'Riordan and Stoll-Kleeman, 2002). 
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The route from macro level policies to their acceptance in the wider society and their 
realisation at community level is very often baffling for government, leading to 
unexpected and frustrating results. While we need top-down policies for 
sustainability, we also need bottom-up methods to ensure they will be accepted. 
Welfare practice, which has always been played out at the local level of the family 
and community, can contribute its own tradition of community development to the 
pursuit of sustainability. The examples given above suggest approaches that could 
usefully be adopted more widely – with government support through funding, 
programme development and training. 
 
Moves towards sustainability by changing values could also be strengthened by 
government investment in voluntary action. We may be grateful that it is beyond the 
capacity of governments to find the answers to all social problems. It is the 
capacities and institutions of wider civil society that will produce the experiment and 
innovation needed for changing values towards sustainability. Government, by 
taking risks of some politically unwelcome or practically ineffective outcomes, can 
support the processes indirectly by means of benign policies for voluntarism.  
Conclusion 
For Volz, the heart of social work is assisting the client to discover, or perhaps we 
can say invent, the character and meaning of the life he wishes to lead. This 
hermeneutic perspective requires a considerably enlargement of the scope of welfare 
and professional ethics beyond the ‘social problems’ conventionally recognised 
within liberal social policy. It moves from the mere negative avoidance of the 
familiar catalogue of social ills towards the active promotion of a positive vision of 
human flourishing. However, in a world where the very survival of civilised life is 
deeply threatened by multiple forms of ecological disaster, it is impossible to 
imagine continued human flourishing without taking account of the challenges 
posed by environmentalism. Social policy and welfare practice have, so far, barely 
begun to engage with the challenge of sustainable development. Although social 
work, for the most part, has equally has failed this engagement, within the theory 
and practice of community development there are seeds of a hermeneutic approach 
to promoting human flourishing relevant to welfare professionals. Such a practice 
would equally be about changing values, which I have suggested needs to be better 
grasped as a goal of social policy. For welfare practice, reconsidering the end of 
what might be termed the self-discovery of human flourishing within the frame of 
the ecological imperative raises larger questions than can possibly be answered in a 
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